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REPLY 
Point 1. The facts in State v. Lane, 771 P. 2d 1150 (Wash.,1989) 
are distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. In State 
v. Lane, supra., the conduct which occurred in Washington and 
formed the basis for that state's jurisdiction was mental conduct 
known as premeditation. Premeditation is an element of the crime 
of first degree murder and it is an element which refers to the 
conduct of the accused, not to the conduct of someone else. This 
case shows only that some criminal conduct of the accused which 
conduct is an essential element of the crime charged must occur 
within the state in order for the state to claim jurisdiction 
and nothing more. The facts do not include the discretionary 
non-proscribed act of a third party as do the facts in the in-
stant case. The case is inapposite here. 
Point 2. Whether the bank exercises its dicretion to pay a draft 
or whether it does not exercise its discretion to pay a draft 
does not necessarily depend on any prior arrangement with the 
maker as respondents brief implies. 
Point 3. Due process requires that notice or process by which 
parties are brought within the jurisdiction of the court which 
will render judgement. The Utah criminal jurisdiction statute 
gives notice that one who commits conduct within this state 
which is proscribed or the result of which is proscribed may 
be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the court. It does 
not give notice that the non-proscribed conduct of a third 
party (not the accused) may subject one to the criminal juris-
diction of the court such as where a bank refuses to pay a draft 
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written by the accused. Where a court wrongfully extends juris-
diction beyond the scope of its authority its judgement violates 
due process and is void. Furthermore to base criminal juris-
diction on the act of a third party not controlled by the accused 
would be an arbitray and capricious act of the government in 
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violation of the guarantee of equal protection. 
The Constitutions of the state and of the United States both 
protect individuals from deprivation of their liberty without due 
process of law. Petitioners sentence below deprived him of his 
liberty. Therefore the court should consider the constitutional 
issues raised even if raised for the first time on appeal. 
Point 4. The state's last arguement is in error. Section 1 
of the bad check statute is a separate crime from that in section 
2/requires knowledge by the accusedthat a check won't be paid. 
The knowledge element is absent from the section 2 crime which 
allows one who writes a check whic is legally refused by the bank 
to cure the default in 14 days to avoid criminal liability. The 
state can charge the section 1 crime regardless of the 14 day 
cure provision in section 2 if it can show culpable knowledge 
on the part of the accused that the chedk would not be paid. 
1 
Jones v. Giles, 741 F.2d 24 (C. A. Wash., 1984): West v. Cap-
itol Federal Savings and loan Ass'n, 558 F. 2d 977 (C. A.Kans., 
1977) . 
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There fore the Utah statute has the same infirmity the Colorado 
court found in its statute. " The actors conduct was complete 
prior to the time taht the disinterested third party bank had 
the complete freedom to decide whether to honor or dishonor the 
insufficient check/1 People v. Smith, 638 P. 2d 1, 6 ( Colo. 1981) 
Like the Colorado statute the Utah statute prevents any cure un-
der section 1. Once the bank dishonors the check the crime is 
complete. I 
Furthermore and in contradistinction to the bad check 
scenario in the case of rape the victims consent or the lack 
of consent will occur or be effective concurrently with the act 
of the accused and not at a different time or in a different 
place. Also the victim is the result of the proscribed conduct 
and is not an independent third party. The tape statute is not 
analagous to the bad check statute. The crime does not depend on 
the arbitrary discretionary act of a third party for its 
completion. 
Dated this day of August, 1990, 
ZL. Dixon D. Hindley 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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